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PHILIPPE J. CRABBE*

Turgot's Brief on Mines and
Quaries: An Early Economic
Analysis of Mineral Land TenureTurgot's little known Brief on Mines and Quaries was published in
France in 1764' and is probably the first economic analysis of the efficiency of a form of mineral-bearing land tenure. Turgot advocated granting mineral rights to the first occupant. His analysis is far superior to the
one made by Adam Smith in his Lectures on Jurisprudencesupporting
2
the granting of mineral rights to the surface owner through accession.
Though Turgot's arguments were discussed during the sessions of the
Constituent Assembly which preceded the adoption of the French Civil
Code in 1804, the latter, in article 552, adopted the accession system of
land acquisition. 3 The French mining law of 1810, however, did not favor
Turgot's proposition and reverted to the regalian right tradition of the
French Old Regime. 4 The regalian right tradition is a system through

which mineral concessions are granted unilaterally and conditionally by

the state.5
Turgot wrote the Brief while serving as Superintendant of Limoges, in
response to a request made to him by the Marquis de Mirabeau, the father

of one of the leaders of the French Revolution. 6 The Marquis asked for
the renewal of a concession for a period of eighty years, over the lead
mine of Glanges located in the province of Limousin. Turgot wrote a

*Department of Economics, University of Ottowa, and GREEN, Universit6 lEaval.
"I am grateful to Anthony D. Scott, professor of economics at the University of British Columbia
for valuable comments.
1. 2 OEUVRES DE TURGOT, MEmoiRE SuR LES MINES Er CARRImREs Er AVIS SUR LE RENouvaLLEMENT DE LA CONCESSION DES MINES DE PLOMB DE GLANGES 356-404 (G. Schelle ed. 1914)
[hereinafter cited as TuRt].
2. A. SMrrH, LacruREs ON JURISPRUDENCE 28 (R.L. Meek, D.D Raphael & P.G. Sein, eds. 1978).
3. Legoyt, Mines, in DiCnONNAIRE DE L'ECONOMIE POLmQUE 178-88 (C. Coquelin & Guillaumin
eds. 3d ed. 1864).
4. Id. at 181-82. Legoyt is perhaps too sanguine about the regalian right interpretation of the law
of 1810. See Carpentier & Frerejouant du Saint, Mines, Minieres, Carrieres, in 27 REPERTOnE
GENERAL ALPHABErIQUE DE DRorr FRANcAIs 776 (1898).
5. Regalian right is "the right that the entire State, represented by the King, reserves to itself to
dispose of the ownership of the underground as if it were public property, independent of the private
property of the land which contains it, and to dispose of it for the greatest advantage of society."
Regina v. De Lery, Que. C.S. (1883) (quoting HERON DE VI.LEFOsSE, DE LA RIcHESsE MINERALE
6, at t. 1 (1810)). It must be emphasized that under the French Old Regime, the regalian right
doctrine applied to all mines and not just to gold and silver mines, as is already clear in the ordinance
of Charles VI (1413). See id.
6. TURGOT, supra note 1, at 355.
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draft of a judgment for the case and a draft proposal for an edict for the
benefit of the Parliament.
The mode of mineral bearing land tenure that Turgot criticized in his
Brief is the concession system which existed in France from the Middle
Ages (at least from the ordinance of Henri II in 1548 and, to some extent,
the ordinance of Louis XI in 1471) to 1791.8 The concession was a
unilateral act of the state granting to someone the exclusive ownership
of the underground of a tract of land forever or for a limited time period
9
conditional upon uninterrupted mining activity. In case of interruption,
the concession became void and the concessionnaire lost all rights not0
only to the mineral already found, but also to the sunken investments."
The concession could be granted, and mining works could actually be
undertaken, without the consent of the surface owner, who was entitled
a concession
to compensation for damage only." Extraction of metal from
2
was subject to a ten percent royalty in favor of the state. The concession
7. Parliaments, under the French Old Regime, had the right not only to pass judgment on specific
cases but to draft edicts and regulations as well. These edicts and regulations were applicable only
within the jurisdiction of the parliaments and were subordinate to the king's authority. See 2 E.
CHFNON, HISTOIRE G0ERALE Du DROrr FRANCAIS PuBLiC ET PRvE 362 (1929); A. EsMEtN, HIsToIRE
DU DRorr FRANCAis 593-95 (11th ed. 1912).
8. The ordinance of Louis XI in 1471, called Ordinance of Montil-lez-Tours, grants to the surface
owner a preferential but conditional right of exploiting the mines located under his tract of land.
The preferential right is conditional upon conveying the information about the existence of mineral
deposit to the crown and authorization after assessment of the owner's expertise and financial
resources by the Master General Superintendant of Mines. Otherwise, the exploitation and exploration
rights are granted to all and the land under which mines are located is subject to rights of way (free
mining). The ordinance of Henri II in 1548 assigns to the king the exclusive right to dispose of the
mines. The beneficiary does not have to compensate the surface owner except for damages to the
surface. It is worth noting that these ordinances were never revoked and were often formally upheld
even though they were modified from time to time. For the texts of the ordinances of the kings of
France, see ISAMBERT, REcuEIL GENERAL Des ANclENNEs Lois FRANCAISES (1822).
The Law of 12 July 1791 allowed the surface owner to extract minerals up to a depth of 100 feet.
A concession was required to dig deeper and was granted preferably to the surface owner. See J.
PERsoNNAz, DRorr DES MINEs 13 (1958).
9. The concession granted by Henry II to the Sieur de Roberval in 1548 was for nine years. See
Carpentier & Frerejouant du Saint, supra note 4.
Under article 21 of the ordinance of Henri IV (1601), the concession was perpetual if the terms
of the concession were respected. See unpublished legal opinion dated 1950 given by E. Asselin in
the matter of the ownership of the underground oil located in Anticosti Island, Quebec. Information
on this case was provided to the author by J.P. Lacasse, professor of civil law at the University of
Ottawa.
The edict of 1722 reverted to temporary concessions. See Carpentier & Frerejouant du Saint,
supra note 4.
10. TuRGOT, supra note 1, at 377-78, 380-81.
11. Id. at 399.
12. The royalty which goes back to the Roman Empire was maintained in France during the
Middle Ages and was upheld by the ordinance of Charles VI (1413) against the pretenses of the
nobles who had been pocketing the royalty. Sometimes the king would permanently or temporarily
exempt certain persons from this royalty, as did Henry II with the Sieur de Roberval for a period
of nine years; or he would exempt certain substances such as coal, iron, etc., as in the edict of
Henri IV (1601), exemption later recalled and then reestablished. See unpublished legal opinion
dated 1955 given by J. Charpentier in the matter of crown rights in oil fields which may be found
on lands granted in Canada under the French Regime (communicated to the author by J.P. Lacasse).
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system did not work well in France. Concessions were often too large,
and the rights of the surface owner and those of the concessionnaire too
ill-defined. The territorial limits of the concession were often imprecise;
neighboring concessions could actually overlap. Litigation was, therefore,
frequent 3 and unbridled speculation was widespread. 4
Turgot advocated that the concession form of mineral land tenure be
abolished and replaced by a system assigning mineral rights to the first
occupant. 5 In order to understand some of Turgot's arguments in favor
of the first occupant system of mineral land tenure, one must remember
that he was a physiocrat. 16 For the physiocrats, only land and its extension,
water, were productive because they yielded a "net product.""' Turgot,
however, did not consider mines as being productive because ". . . a
mine produces no fruit. The mine itself is the garnered fruit."' 8 Physiocrats opposed all forms of monoply as well."

Turgot proposed five economic arguments in favor of abolishing the
concession system. He proposed other arguments, more legal in nature,
in favor of assigning mineral rights to the first occupant rather than to
the surface owner (accession) or the state (regalian right). This article

focuses on Turgot's economic arguments.
Turgot argued that the concession system should be abolished because
the concession system is an obstacle to competition." Exclusive own13. Legoyt, supra note 3. See PERSONNAZ, supra note 8, at 13. In personal correspondence with
this author, A.D. Scott pointed out that frequent litigation does not constitute an indictment against
a tenure system. Actually,... the spate of lawsuits is what would be expected when a new system
of tenure comes in."
Given that the concession sytem was established in France in 1548 at the latest, and abolished in
1791, and given that Legoyt's assessment was made in the 19th century, the objection does not
apply. Moreover, mining cases were heard exclusively by the King's Council, and not by the courts.
MATrHtEu, in his CODE DES MIES, said of this procedure:
There, laws were modified by particular decisions; credit, favor, intrigue were responsible for obtaining and revoking successively the same concessions, and the Constituent Assembly, when it dealt with the relevant part of the legislation, was convinced
that mines had become the prey of courtiers gambling with the rights of the surface
owners as well as the ones of the inventors.
(quoted in Regina v. De Lery, supra note 5).
14. See Legoyt, supra note 3.
15. TURGOT, supra note 1, art. IV of edict proposal at 369-70, 403.
16. A physiocrat is
a follower of a French physician and economist Francois Quesnay who in the 18th
century founded a system of political and economic doctrines based on the supremacy
of natural order and emphasizing the powers of nature as the source of public wealth
and national prosperity and the only proper source of public revenue and the necessity
for governing so as not to interfere with the natural laws which affect the relations
and processes of society and industry.
,VEBsTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 1707 (Gove ed. 1976).
17. 1 G. WEULERESSE, LE MouvEmENT PtYsiOCRATiQuE EN FRANca: 1756-1770, 227-79; Crabbe,
The Contribution of L. C. Gray to the Economic Theory of Exhaustible Natural Resources and its
Roots in the History of Economic Thought, 10 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMfr. 197 (1983).
18. TURGOT, supra note 1, at 392.
19. See WEULERESSE, supra note 17; Crabbe, supra note 17.
20. TURGOT, supra note 1, at 401.
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ership, instead of being granted upon the whole underground of a tract
of land, should be limited to the veins actually being worked, to the
extracted mineral, the works, the wells, and the galleries. 2' Only the
product of the miner's work should be withdrawn from competition through
exclusive ownership and should be considered personal property of the
miner. 2 Turgot asserted that the mine workings and products should
belong to the one who has actual possession of them, and should not be
considered an accessory to surface ownership.' Granting mineral rights
to the surface owner would not yield any advantage to the parties involved,
but would only discourage extraction since the surface owner may not
be interested in or qualified to extract the mineral. The exclusive property
rights granted to the holder of the mineral rights, moreover, should be
perpetual in order to eliminate the entrepreneur's risk resulting from tenure
uncertainty.2 4 The perpetual character of the property rights and the restriction of those property rights to the veins, minerals, and works, rather
than their extension to the whole underground, would assign a redeeming
value to those rights. Here Turgot showed a keen economic intuition
because it has only recently been proven that uncertainty of tenure leads
to a reduction of the mining assets' value.'
Turgot rejected the attempt to justify ownership of the whole underground on the basis of economies of scale and the non-exclusive (public
good) character of mineral exploration information. 26 He believed that
the large investment required for mining operations constitutes a sufficient
barrier to entry on a given mineral tract.27 Here again, Turgot's reference
to information externalities which attract too much mining effort and to
the capital intensive nature of mining activity acting as a barrier to entry
demonstrated a sharp economic intuition.28
Turgot's second economic argument focused on the consent of the
surface owners. Turgot asserted that the consent of the surface owners
should be required for mine openings, and the terms and conditions of
that consent should be determined by contract in order to encourage
competition among the prospective parties.29 Turgot considered the risk
21. Id. at 403, arts. IV, V, and VI of edict proposal.
22. ld.. at 370-71. "However, the said entrepreneur will not be able to claim any exclusive
privilege, or follow up on the banks or veins of the said matters beyond the diggings that he actually
would be carrying out." (art. 6 of edict draft proposal).
23. Id. at 392.
24. Id. at 403, art. IV and V of edict proposal.
25. Long, Resources Extractionunder the Uncertaintyabout PossibleNationalization,10 J. ECON
THEORY 42-53 (1975).
26. TURGOT, supra note 1, at 377-78, 382-85.
27. Id. at 382.
28. On exploration information externalities, see R. GILBERT, THE SOCIAL AND PRIVATE VALUE
OF EXPLORATION INFORMATION IN THE ECONOMICS OF EXPLORATION FOR ENERGY RESOURCES (S.B.
Ramsey ed. 1981).
29. TuRGoT, supra note 1, at 403, art. III of edict proposal.
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of nuisance possession by the surface owner as minimal.30 Indeed, a
contractual agreement will always be within the reach of the prospective
holder of mineral rights if he is willing to pay to the surface owner a
sufficiently high price. The prospective holder of mineral rights is able
to blackmail the surface owner because, in case of disagreement, he could
locate his mine openings on neighboring tracts whose surface owners
would be more accommodating.31
Third, Turgot proposed that the holder of mineral rights must have the
right to extend the mine workings to neighboring tracts without prior
authorization of their surface owner. The holder of the mineral rights,
however, must compensate neighboring surface owners in case of damage
to their lands.32 This third policy, Turgot asserted, would encourage economies of scale and prevent irregular workings.3 3
Turgot further suggested that payment of royalties on the mineral to
the state should be abolished, except on iron.34 Mining activity whose
opportunity cost is the cost of importing minerals would be encouraged
and would lead to a decrease of mineral imports. In any case, royalties
bring little revenue to the state.35 Turgot thought that royalties paid to the
state were too high for the then current level of profits in mines. He
argued that profits must include a reward for risks above the profits
required to reward the considerable investment of mining.36 This is especially true when the royalty is levied on the metal itself. An additional
reason for not taxing mines is that mines do not yield the "net profit" of
the physiocrats because they are not productive.37
Turgot's last economic argument is in accordance with physiocratic
policy, and asserts that authorizations and formalities which limit access
30. Id. at 386-87.
31. Id. at 372-73, 385-87.
32. Id. at 403, art. I of edict proposal.
33. Id. at 373. A.D. Scott, supra note 13, pointed out that the right of extension leads to
inefficiency. This is certainly true if one looks at it from the property rights point of view since it
is a logical consequence of the first occupant system. However, if one takes into consideration the
economies of scale argument as well, one is faced with a second best problem which, as usual, is
inconclusive about piecemeal removal of inefficiencies. See J.J. LAFFONT, COURS DE THEORIE MtCROECONOMIQuE 139 (1983).
34. TuROT, supra note 1, at 403, art. VII of edict proposal. Turgot does not make clear the
reasons why he wants to maintain royalties on iron. According to the ordinance of 1601, article 2,
sulfur, saltpetre, iron, ochre, oil, coal, slate, plaster, and stones used as building material or for
millstones were exempted from royalty. The ratio legis is that the exemption gave an incentive to
surface owners to exploit the mines themselves and, thereby, encourage mining activity and competition with foreign mines. See Asselin, supra note 9. Turgot, a physiocrat, could hardly quarrel
with this objective. In 1773, TIrgot reversed his position on iron royalties in his last work, the Letter
to the General ComptrollerAbout the Stamping of Iron, in which he advocates the abolition of all
duties on iron. See TuRGOT, ECRITs ECONOMIQUES 383 (B. Cazes ed. 1970).
35. TuRGOT, supra note 1, at 394-97.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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to minerals should be eliminated. Development of minerals should be
available to as many interested parties as possible.3 8
Turgot accepted the separation of ownership of the underground mineral
estate from that of the surface estate as recognized by traditional French
jurisprudence supporting the regalian right. However, instead of granting
the underground property to the state, as is customary with the regalian
right, he recommended granting mineral rights to the first occupant and
provided legal support for his proposition.
Mineral rights ownership should not be granted to the state (regalian
right) because the state does not have access to the underground without
going through the surface, thereby encroaching upon the private property
rights of the surface owners. Historically, mineral rights were attributed
to the state39 for fiscal reasons and in the interest of a too narrowly-defined
public security. The argument which justifies granting the ownership of
vacant lands to the state because the lands are "res nullius" cannot,
therefore, be applicable to mineral land. 4 Moreover, the regalian right
encroaches upon the right of the surface owner to dig into his own land.
Furthermore, accession canpot be justified because the surface owner is
unable to exert possession over the underground; the unextracted minerals
are not the product of his work. Diggings done underground by a third
party do not generally damage the surface and, because the surface owner
cannot detect the diggings"he cannot prevent them.
The Marquis de Mirabeau obtained his eighty year concession. 4' Turgot's position in favor of granting mineral rights to the first occupant got
virtually no support at the Constitutional Assembly.42 Mirabeau, the son
of the Marquis, opposed Turgot's position on the ground that "it would
make of the mines an inextricable maze." 4 3 Mine development would be
haphazard and a constant source of disagreement which, in turn, would
lead to the law benefiting the one in least need of legal protection. Mirabeau, the son, defended on rather ideological grounds the regalian right
which was eventually adopted in the French mining law of 1810.'
The fundamental weaknesses of the first occupant system of mineral
rights tenure escaped Turgot. The ownership of mineral rights granted to
the first occupant is, indeed, a form of open-access resource leading to
an excessive level of exploration and extraction as well as to "skimming,"
38. Id. at 403, art. I and VIII of edict proposal.
39. Id. at 369.
40. Id. at 369-70. A res nullius is an object originally not owned by anyone and whose ownership
can be acquired only through possession or occupation. See JURIS-CLASSEUR CiviL, art 713, MODEs
DWvERS D'ACQUERIR LA PROPRIETE DES BIENs SANs MARs.

41.
42.
43.
44.

TURGOT, supra note 1, at 404.

Legoyt, supra note 3.
Id.
See PERSONNAZ, supra note 8; see also supra note 5.
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i.e., the early abandonment of the extraction of the lower grades of
minerals.' Few countries have adopted the first occupant system for
mining. Lawyers have tended to reject it on the grounds that the system
does not offer guarantees for the technical or financial competence of the
mining entrepreneur and that it creates risk of conflict and forceful possession.'

45. A.C. FISHER, RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT IN ECONOMICS 63-67, 86-89 (1981).
46. 5 J.P. LACASSE, LA PROPREM DES MINES EN DRorr QUEBECOIS, JUSTINiEN 22-40 (1965).
M.D. Dalloz calls the first occupant system "impracticable." See Dalloz, Mines, Minieres, Carrieres,
in 31 REPERTOIRE DE LEGISLATION, DE Doc"RENE ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 606 (1854).

